We use a sample of banks from 24 European countries to investigate whether the adoption of the Basel II Capital Accord in 2008 affects the market valuation of discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs). Although Basel II lowers the incentives of internal ratingsbased (IRB) banks to recognize income-increasing DLLPs in an opportunistic manner, it has no such impact on the remaining banks, which adopt the Standardized methodology. We use this setup in a difference-in-difference (DiD) design, where Standardized banks act as a control group. Our evidence supports the three hypotheses that, for IRB relative to Standardized banks, Basel II is associated with (i) less income-increasing DLLPs and (ii) less income-smoothing via DLLPs, which enhances the informational content of DLLPs about future loan losses and leads to (iii) higher market valuation of DLLPs. Our findings are timely and have policy implications for future regulatory developments in the banking industry.
Introduction
Loan loss provisions (LLPs) represent banks' main accruals, over which managers have considerable discretion. Managers can use this discretion either opportunistically to smooth income (i.e., manage earnings) or to convey private information to investors (Beatty, Ke & Petroni 2002 , Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Mathieu 2003 , Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Yang 2004 , Kanagaretnam, Lim & Lobo 2010 . Under Basel I, reducing LLPs allows managers to increase earnings and regulatory capital and, thereby, the market valuation of the bank (Kim & Kross 1998) . The Basel II Capital Accord, effective since 2008, introduces a countervailing link between LLPs and regulatory capital. In this paper, we investigate whether this new regulation affects the market valuation of the discretionary part of LLPs.
Basel II has sparked substantial debate and scholarly interest in recent years regarding, among others, internal risk rating systems (Jacobson, Lindé & Roszbach 2006) , a potential pro-cyclical effect of the regulation on lending cycles (Gordy & Howells 2006 , Heid 2007 , proposals for forward-looking modeling of default probabilities (Pederzoli & Torricelli 2005) , and country-specific differences in the implementation of the new regulation (Barth, Caprio & Levine 2008 , Herring 2007 . In contrast, the effect of Basel II on the market valuation of discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs) has yet to receive attention. As documented in the extant literature, changes in banking or accounting regulations that affect banks' provisioning practices tend to affect the informativeness of banks' DLLPs and their market valuation. For example, Moyer (2006) finds evidence that banks make accounting adjustments to follow capital adequacy guidelines. Consistent with this finding, Kim & Kross (1998) find that Basel I introduces an incentive for banks to reduce LLPs to increase both net income and regulatory capital. In turn, Ahmed, Takeda & Thomas (1999) find that, after the adoption of Basel I, banks use LLPs to manage capital but not earnings. Likewise, Kilic, Lobo, Ranasinghe & Sivaramakrishnan (2013) (1-tax rate)(1-d) Euros, where d is the dividend payout ratio. By introducing a direct relation between LLPs and the level of regulatory capital, Basel II reduces IRB banks' incentive for income smoothing through an opportunistic use of income-increasing DLLPs. In contrast, the incentives to use DLLPs opportunistically for income-smoothing purposes remain unchanged for banks following the Standardized approach. Therefore, with the adoption of Basel II, IRB banks should rely less on DLLPs for the purpose of smoothing income than Standardized banks, because such opportunistic use of DLLPs makes it difficult to comply with the solvency requirements. As a consequence, the DLLPs of IRB banks should exhibit a higher informational content for financial market participants, in comparison to the Standardized banks.
Extant evidence suggests that less opportunistic DLLPs have higher market valuations (Wahlen 1994) . For instance, Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & Lobo (2009) find that the valua-1 More precisely, the 1990 Basel I Capital Accord defines general loan loss provisions (GLLPs) as those set aside to cover expected "but not yet incurred" losses. Thus, these GLLPs contain forward-looking information on a bank's future credit losses (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011) . According to Basel I, they are not part of Tier 1 capital and can only be included directly in Tier 2 capital up to a proportion of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted capital. Therefore, for banks with GLLPs that exceed this threshold, a decrease in LLPs results in an increase in both earnings and the capital ratio.
tion of DLLPs depends on auditor reputation, which is inversely related to the opportunistic use of DLLPs. Hence, Basel II should lead to an increase in the market valuation of IRB banks' DLLPs.
We draw on a sample of 103 listed banks from 24 European countries for the years 2006 to 2011 and use a difference-in-difference (DiD) research design to test our hypotheses.
Because many of the variables necessary to study the impact of Basel II on the valuation of DLLPs are not available from public databases, such as BVD Bankscope, we hand-collect much of our data. This results in a unique data set that allows us to test our hypotheses using empirical models that to date have been used only for U.S. samples, for which data are more readily available than in Europe. To investigate whether the adoption of Basel II has affected the market valuation of IRB banks' DLLPs, we perform the following three tests. We first estimate DLLPs as the residuals of a regression of LLPs on all of their normal determinants (as in Wahlen 1994 , Adams, Carow & Perry 2009 , Kanagaretnam et al. 2009 ). Further, we follow Cohen, Dey & Lys (2008) and split DLLPs into incomeincreasing and income-decreasing ones. Because Standardized banks are not affected by the new prudential regulations, they can serve as a control group in our DiD design. In line with our expectations, after the adoption of Basel II, income-increasing DLLPs are lower for IRB relative to Standardized banks. This raises the question of whether the reduction in income-increasing DLLPs translates into a lower level of opportunistic reporting, proxied by income smoothing behavior.
Therefore, in a second step, we test the effect of the adoption of Basel II on the association between LLPs and earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPT) for IRB and Standardized banks. Consistent with our prediction, the level of income smoothing through DLLPs is significantly lower in the post-than in the pre-Basel II period for IRB relative to Standardized banks. This finding suggests that Basel II discourages managers of IRB banks from recognizing opportunistic DLLPs, which is in line with banking regulators' objective of ensuring the long-term financial stability of banks (Borio, Furfine & Lowe 2001 , Laeven & Majnoni 2003 . The economic climate prevailing in the year during which Basel II was 3 adopted represents a notable challenge for the empirical test of our hypotheses. Fudenberg & Tirole (1995) and DeFond & Park (1997) argue that income-increasing activities are more prevalent in times of economic hardship because of concerns over job security and management credibility. Thus, given an economic crisis, we should find that all banks engage in more income-increasing activities following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. 2 Indeed, we find that Standardized banks recognize more income-increasing DLLPs and engage in more income smoothing after the adoption of Basel II, which is a normal response to the economic turmoil (as documented in Liu & Ryan 2006) . Unlike Standardized banks, IRB banks need to comply with Basel II, which curbs their ability to smooth income through income-increasing DLLPs in the post-Basel II period. As expected, our results confirm that IRB banks do not increase their opportunistic reporting after 2008, which indicates that our results are attributable to the change in banking regulation rather than to the economic crisis.
In a third step, we regress stock returns on DLLPs to investigate whether DLLPs are valued more by the market given the impact of Basel II on both income-increasing DLLPs and income smoothing. We find that the post-adoption DiD coefficient of DLLPs is positive and significant, which suggests that the market assigns a higher valuation to the DLLPs of IRB banks after the adoption of Basel II. The positive association between returns and IRB banks' DLLPs in the post-Basel II period indicates that Basel II sends a two-fold message to financial market participants. First, DLLPs contain more information regarding future expected losses, which is incorporated into stock prices by the market, consistent with previous literature (such as Wahlen 1994 , Beaver & Engel 1996 . Second, their lesser reliance on DLLPs for income-smoothing purposes also tells investors that, in times of financial distress, IRB banks are more likely to maintain capital solvency, which is positively valued by investors (Huizinga & Laeven 2012 ).
We perform a number of robustness tests on our results. First, in our estimations, we control for the impact of macroeconomic variables on loan loss provisions. We check the ro-bustness of our findings to the use of different time windows. A set of placebo tests confirms that the effect we find is attributable to the new regulations and not to possible confounding factors. Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the use of an alternative control group composed of U.S. commercial banks instead of Standardized banks.
Our findings contribute to the banking literature and provide policy implications for banking and accounting regulators. In particular, we show that a change in prudential regulations aimed at furthering financial stability has a significant impact on IRB banks' provisioning practices and heightens the informational content and the market valuation of the DLLPs of IRB banks. The results of our study inform the debate over the effects and merits of Basel II and the potential implications of Basel III. Moreover, these results are relevant for accounting regulators and practitioners in the context of the introduction of IFRS 9 in 2018. This new accounting standard introduces a one-year horizon forward-looking expected credit loss model, which conforms to the requirements of Basel II. Therefore, we offer accounting regulators early evidence of the relevance of IFRS 9 from the perspective of investors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe our hypotheses. We present our empirical methodology in Section 3 and our data in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our results and Section 6 our robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions.
Hypotheses
General loan loss provisions (GLLPs) are provisions set aside to cover expected "but not yet incurred" losses. By construction, they contain forward-looking information on a bank's future credit losses (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011) . According to the 1990 Basel I Capital Accord, GLLPs are not part of Tier 1 capital and can only be included directly in Tier 2 capital up to a proportion of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted capital. Therefore, for banks with GLLPs that exceeds this threshold, a decrease in LLPs results in an increase 5 in both earnings and the capital ratio. More specifically, a reduction in LLPs of 1 Euro leads to an increase in earnings of (1-tax rate) Euros. This increase has an indirect effect of (1-tax rate) (1-d) Euros on Tier 1 capital, where d is the dividend payout ratio, through the channel of retained earnings. 3 Hence, under Basel I, banks have an incentive to reduce LLPs because doing so achieves the double objective of increasing net income and regulatory capital (Kim & Kross 1998) Specific and collective provisions cannot be included in Tier 2 capital because they do not cover "not-incurred" losses. 4 Thus, in the pre-Basel II period, banks have no incentive to increase their provisions because doing so would decrease their earnings and concurrently decrease their Tier 1 capital. Instead, banks have an incentive to register income-increasing (negative) DLLPs to keep their LLPs small.
In contrast, Basel II allows for collective provisions to be used for the purpose of increasing regulatory capital for banks that adopt the IRB approach. Basel II differs from Basel I in that it divides banks according to their internal risk management systems into IRB and Standardized banks, and adjusts their capital requirements accordingly. The IRB approach is characterized by internally determined risk measurements and high differentiation in required capital between riskier and safer credits. 5 The Standardized approach is implemented by banks with less developed internal risk management systems. Their credit risk and the size of their capital requirements are measured on the basis of external credit assessments from ratings agencies.
Generally, the IRB approach results in a lower capital charge; thus, banks have strong incentives to adopt it. To become IRB, banks need to apply to their national regulators and show that they have the technical capacity to accurately measure the credit risk of their portfolio in-house. The costs of such a sophisticated IRB risk management system are high.
Therefore, in practice, banks are naturally segmented into large banks that adopt the IRB approach and smaller banks that stay with the Standardized approach (see e.g. Hakenes & Schnabel 2011) . In our empirical work, to alleviate potential concerns of endogeneity given the choice between Standardized and IRB banks, we include bank fixed effects and control for size. 6
For Standardized banks, Basel II does not change the regulatory treatment of LLPs.
Yet, the post-2008 period is marked by increased economic turmoil given the onset of the financial crisis. According to previous studies, managers are more likely to perform income-increasing activities and smooth earnings during economic downturns (Fudenberg & Tirole 1995 , DeFond & Park 1997 . Given this incentive and the fact that the provision-5 Basel II divides IRB banks even further into Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB. However, these two options do not differ with respect to the computation of capital requirements. Therefore, for simplicity, we refer to both options as IRB.
6 Bank fixed effects address the potential effect of all unobserved time-invariant variables on the choice between the status of Standardized and IRB banks. Because these determinants do not vary much over time, given that the choice of becoming IRB is unlikely to be reverted, we believe that this addresses most of the selection issue. As outlined in Hypothesis 1.A, in contrast to Standardized banks, IRB banks have an incentive to narrow the gap between actual LLPs and expected losses by reducing income-increasing DLLPs. In principle, they could achieve the same result by recognizing more income-decreasing DLLPs. However, if banks choose to strategically increase positive DLLPs and build up "cookie-jar" reserves, they must revert them in future periods by recognizing income-increasing DLLPs. They then incur high regulatory capital costs.
Thus, at best, this solution is only short-term and does not close the gap between actual LLPs and expected losses in the long run. This option becomes even less likely in light of Hypothesis 1.A, which already predicts a reduction in income-increasing DLLPs. The mechanical relationship between income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs in the long run implies that any discretionary reporting based on accruals needs to be reverted in future periods. 7 Thus, given the strong incentive to reduce income-increasing DLLPs under Basel II, in the long run, IRB banks should also reduce their income-decreasing DLLPs relative to Standardized banks. Given our short-term window of analysis, we have a mild expectation to find support for the following hypothesis. According to Liu & Ryan (1995) and Liu & Ryan (2006) , all else equal, banks prefer smoother earnings.
Nonetheless, extant research suggests that banks adjust their income smoothing behavior to regulatory pressure. For instance, Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011) find that the adoption of IFRS lowers banks' incentives to use discretion in provisioning, which leads to an understatement of LLPs and reduced levels of income smoothing. We expect a similar 7 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this fact. (Liu & Ryan 1995) . Therefore, both Standardized and IRB banks have an incentive to smooth their earnings in the post-adoption period.
As the regulatory pressure introduced by the new Capital Accord does not apply to the provisioning of Standardized banks (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011) , their recognition of income-increasing DLLPs for income smoothing purposes is solely driven by the effect of the economic crisis. Given the asymmetric impact of Basel II on the two groups, Standardized banks are likely to manage their earnings more in the post-adoption period. Therefore, relative to these banks, the income smoothing of IRB banks via DLLPs should decrease with the adoption of Basel II, which leads us to our second hypothesis. Taken together, relative to Standardized banks, the DLLPs of IRB banks are valued more by market participants as they contain a higher informational content regarding both future losses and banks' ability to meet capital solvency requirements. Therefore, on the basis of the extant literature, we formulate our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The market valuation of DLLPs increases after the adoption of Basel II for
IRB banks relative to Standardized banks.
Empirical models
We test our hypotheses using a panel data method with firm fixed effects to control for the possible effect of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level, which could otherwise lead to omitted variable bias and cause endogeneity problems in pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. Failing to control for bank fixed effects can result in biased coefficients and misleading conclusions. 8 Given that our main issue is to shield our estimations from potential endogeneity concerns, we chose to use firm fixed effects for all models throughout the paper, which is the more conservative option. In the following subsections, we provide a detailed explanation of the specific models that we estimate to test each of our hypotheses.
Income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs
To determine the impact of Basel II on the level of income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs, we use a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we follow previous literature (Wahlen 1994 , Kanagaretnam et al. 2004 , Kanagaretnam et al. 2009 ) and estimate the nondiscretionary component of LLPs as the residual of the following OLS regression of LLPs on their normal determinants:
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, LLP ict stands for loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets, NPL ict and ∆NPL ict are, respectively, non-performing loans and their differences scaled by beginning total assets, Loan ict and ∆Loan ict stand for, respectively, outstanding loans and their differences scaled by beginning total assets, NCO ict is net chargeoffs scaled by beginning total assets, and ε ict is a residual. Although a number of possible loan loss provision models exist (for a detailed discussion, see Beatty & Liao 2014), our choice is limited by our use of a cross-country sample. Moreover, we refrain from using specifications that include leads and lags because doing so might interfere with our research design and obscure the comparison of the pre-and post-Basel II periods. We consider as normal determinants of LLPs the level and change of loans and nonperforming loans (NPLs), as well as net charge-offs (NCO). Banks are expected to set the level of LLPs according to the size of their loan portfolio. Given the uncertainty regarding the quality of loans, the effect of change in loans on LLPs is ambiguous (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004) . In contrast, LLPs should increase with NPLs, which represent an objective measure of portfolio risk (Wahlen 1994) .
Because changes in NPLs are likely to be serially correlated (Wahlen 1994) , they constitute a good predictor of future losses. We further expect that provisions increase with NCOs because the two variables are mechanically related (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004 ). Because our aim is to control for normal determinants of LLPs, we choose not to include control variables, such as bank size and Tier 1 ratio, that do not qualify as normal determinants of LLPs but that are more likely connected to the discretionary part of LLPs (Ahmed et al. 1999 , Fonseca & Gonzalez 2008 . Table 2 provides further details about our variables. The estimated residual from Equation (1) is the discretionary part of LLPs, DLLP ict ≡ε ict (Wahlen 1994 , Kanagaretnam et al. 2004 , Kanagaretnam et al. 2009 ). In the second stage, we split DLLPs into incomeincreasing (negative) and income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs. We further use a Differencein-Difference (DiD) design to test whether IRB banks use their discretion to recognize more or less income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs relative to Standardized banks and subsequent to the adoption of Basel II. We build on Ashbaugh, LaFond & Mayhew (2003) , Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) , and the cross-country study of Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & Lobo (2010) . In addition, we include bank fixed effects in our model, which allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant bank-level heterogeneity. We estimate the following equation to control for the determinants of DLLPs:
where Basel t is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB i is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, LLP ic,t−1 is lagged LLPs scaled by beginning total assets, EBPT ict is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets, Loss ict is an indicator variable equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, Size ict is bank size measured as the log of beginning total assets, Growth ict is the growth rate of total assets, Tier1 ict is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, GDP Growth ct is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemployment ct is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, γ t is a year dummy, δ i is a bank fixed effect, and ε ict is a residual. Note that in Equation (2) and in the following, we include Basel t and IRB i for completeness of the DiD effect; however, the θ 1 and θ 2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects and year dummies in the estimations that include them. Our controls include variables that do not qualify as normal determinants of LLPs but that are more likely connected to the discretionary part of LLPs, such as Tier 1 and Size. Given the incentives for opportunistic reporting that Tier 1 introduces, it can be considered one of the main determinants of DLLPs (see Ahmed et al. 1999 , Fonseca & Gonzalez 2008 . Regarding Size, the same explanation holds. Banks of different size are likely to be subject to different levels of regulatory scrutiny (Beatty & Liao 2014) , which will result in differences in the level of discretion over provisioning. We also include a Loss indicator, which accounts for the fact that banks are more likely to manipulate provisions when their income is negative (see Brown 2001 , Frankel, Johnson & Nelson 2002 . We further include a control for growth in assets, which is associated with abnormal accruals, as documented in prior research (see Ashbaugh et al. 2003 , Kanagaretnam, Lim & Lobo 2010 In turn, we estimate Equation (2) with the absolute value of income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs as dependent variables. Income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs are defined as max(DLLP ict , 0), whereas income-decreasing (negative) DLLPs are defined as − min(DLLP ict , 0). Note that, according to this convention, both components are positive such that a decrease in both positive and negative DLLPs implies an overall decrease in discretionary reporting. Another way to think about this concept is that the share of discretionary LLPs decreases, or DLLPs become less volatile. Thus, a negative DiD coefficient θ 3 in Equation (2) means that, after the adoption of Basel II, IRB banks recognize less income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs relative to Standardized banks. after controlling for differences in the amount and type of loans, non-performing loans, bank size, time dummies, and bank fixed effects. Although our interest is in the effect of Basel II on DLLPs, which involves regressing the residuals of Equation (1) on the Basel II dummy, such a two-step approach may lead to an attenuation bias in the second stage coefficients.
Income smoothing through LLPs
9 We thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion. 
where HPI ct is the country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return and Term Spread ct is the country-specific difference between short-term and long-term interest rates. The θ 4 coefficient represents the association between LLPs and EBPT, and, if positive and significant, shows that banks smooth income. θ 5 is the incremental effect after the adoption of Basel II. If the requirements of Basel II make banks rely less on LLPs to smooth their income, then θ 5 should be negative and significant. Hypothesis 2 implies that the DiD coefficient θ 7 , which measures the incremental effect of the Basel II adoption on the extent to which IRB banks smooth income, is negative. As in Equation (2), we use NPL, ∆NPL, Loan, ∆Loan, and NCO to control for the normal determinants (non-discretionary part) of LLPs. We expect a positive coefficient for Loan because the larger the amount of loans held as assets by a bank, the more LLPs it will have. The change in total loans outstanding can be positively or negatively related to the level of LLPs depending on the riskiness of the loans.
Regarding the level of non-performing loans (NPL) and their change (∆NPL), we expect a positive relation with LLPs because more non-performing loans require higher provisioning.
We further include controls for Tier 1 and Size, and we account for the potential impact of the business cycle on loan loss provisioning using GDP Growth, ∆Unemployment, House
Price Index returns, and Term Spread. Our use of year dummies and bank fixed effects is consistent with the cross-country studies of Fonseca & Gonzalez (2008) and Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011) .
Market Valuation of DLLPs
Following Kilic et al. (2013), we measure the market valuation of DLLPs as the coefficient in a regression of annual stock returns on DLLPs. Similar to prior literature that deals with the information content of reported numbers (Tucker & Zarowin 2006) , our study assumes market efficiency. We test Hypothesis 3 using bank fixed effect and year dummies in a DiD design. Our interest is in analyzing how the association between market returns and DLLPs changes before and after the adoption of Basel II for IRB versus Standardized banks. We also allow for a DiD in the effect of EBPT on stock returns to ensure that the adoption of Basel II specifically impacts the valuation of DLLPs and that our results are not driven by the influence of other confounding effects at the time of the adoption. To test Hypothesis 3, we estimate the following regression model.
where R ict is the yearly stock return computed from the end of the first quarter. Note that for this estimation, EBTP ict , ∆NPL ict , and NCO ict are scaled by the beginning market value of total equity (market capitalization). Our choice of controls is based on the notion that the market reacts more to the disclosure of bad relative to good news (see Mendenhall & Nichols 1988 , Basu 1997 . Non-performing loans (NPL) and net charge-offs (NCO) are considered bad news for banks, and prices are likely to respond to changes in their level. Although Equation (4) builds on the U.S.-based studies of Kilic et al. (2013) and Kanagaretnam, Lim & Lobo (2010) , in addition to year dummies, we also include bank fixed effects to deal with the endogeneity issues raised by the possible presence of unobserved bank-level heterogeneity given that we rely on a sample of banks from 24 countries. Table 3 Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations of our main variables. As in the previous literature, LLPs are correlated with EBPT, NPL, and Loans (Kim & Kross 1998 , Fonseca & Gonzalez 2008 .
11 We also check the robustness of our results by considering late adopters as Standardized during the entire sample period; see Section 6.1. Table 5 shows the results of the first-step regression of LLPs on their normal determinants, as per Equation (1). We perform this estimation first for the full sample in Column (1) Table 6 shows the results of the regression of income-increasing (Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7)) and income-decreasing DLLPs (Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)) on the Basel II dummy, as per Equation (2). Using income-increasing DLLPs as a dependent variable, we obtain a negative θ 3 coefficient, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficients in Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) imply that, relative to the pre-adoption period, the magnitude of income-increasing DLLPs of IRB banks becomes 78% of a standard deviation smaller than that of Standardized banks after Basel II. 12 Moreover, the results are remarkably stable across all four estimations for both the value and level of significance of the coefficient. Therefore, IRB banks, relative to Standardized banks, reduce the level of income-increasing DLLPs after the adoption of Basel II. Taken together, these results confirm Hypothesis 1.A. Basel II introduces an incentive for banks to reduce their income-increasing DLLPs. Specifically, given the connection between DLLPs and regulatory capital, IRB banks are likely to rely less on income-increasing DLLPs for opportunistic reasons in the post-adoption relative to the pre-adoption period. Given that regulatory pressure is targeted at IRB banks, finding an incremental impact of Basel II adoption for these banks confirms our expectations.
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Income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs
With income-decreasing DLLPs, θ 3 is negative and has the same magnitude as incomeincreasing DLLPs for the entire sample, but is not significant. This lack of significance is potentially the result of a reduced sample size 13 or to the short post-Basel II adoption window in our sample. The reduction in the magnitude of income-decreasing DLLPs corresponds to 38% of the standard deviation of positive DLLPs, approximately half the effect we obtain for negative DLLPs. 14 Thus, overall, we find very weak support for Hypothesis
1.B.
Regarding the control variables, their coefficients are in line with the previous literature.
Lagged LLPs are positively (negatively) associated with the absolute value of negative (positive) DLLPs. The coefficient of the Loss variable suggests that when banks suffer losses, they tend to increase both types of DLLPs. Growth is positively associated with the absolute value of income-increasing (negative) DLLPs, but insignificant for income-12 Because the coefficients are based on a fixed-effect estimation, we use the within firm standard deviation of income-increasing DLLPs based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with firm effects as the only factors. The result is 0.0014 for income-increasing DLLPs. 13 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this explanation. 14 The within firm standard deviation of income-decreasing DLLPs is 0.0029.
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decreasing (positive) DLLPs. GDP growth is negatively and significantly related only to income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs, whereas the change in unemployment is insignificant for both positive and negative DLLPs.
Our next test allows us to determine whether the overall reduction in income-increasing DLLPs leads to an incremental reduction in the level of opportunistic reporting in IRB banks, proxied by income smoothing through LLPs. Table 7 reports the results of the income smoothing regressions of LLPs on EBPT for the entire sample in Columns (1), (2) The coefficient θ 7 of the interaction of Basel IRB and EBPT is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all specified models, which confirms Hypothesis 2. Again, our coefficient is remarkably stable across different periods and is unaffected by the inclusion of year dummies. The magnitudes of the effects imply that a one standard deviation change in EBPT leads to a reduction of approximately 20% of a standard deviation in LLPs in IRB compared to Standardized banks after the adoption of Basel II. 15
Income smoothing through LLPs
The coefficient of the interaction between IRB and EBPT, θ 6 , is not significant in any of our estimations. This lack of statistical significance suggests that no pre-intervention differences exist between the IRB and Standardized banks, which lends support to our choice of the control sample. However, the coefficient of the interaction between Basel and EBPT, (Estrella & Mishkin 1998 ). In our sample, housing price index returns do not seem to be systematically related to LLPs. 16
Market valuation of DLLPs
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the market valuation of DLLPs increases after the adoption of Basel II for IRB relative to Standardized banks. Column (2) we include year dummies for robustness. In Columns (3) and (4), as in previous sections, we eliminate both 2008 and 2011 to check the robustness of our results in a shorter post-Basel II window. The coefficient of the IRB*DLLP interaction is not significant in any of our models, which indicates that no pre-Basel II adoption differences exist between IRB and Standardized groups. Our results also show that the Basel*DLLP interaction is not significant, suggesting that the valuation of DLLPs in the control group after Basel II does not change.
The coefficient θ 7 of the Basel*IRB*DLLP triple interaction is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in Column (1), at the 5 percent level in Columns (2) and (3), and at the 8 percent level in Column (4). Although its magnitude is difficult to interpret, it implies that a one standard deviation increase in DLLPs leads to an increase of 28%, 16%, 21%, and 13% of the standard deviation of returns, respectively, for Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4). 17 This result indicates that investors infer additional information regarding future 16 Our results are robust to interacting macroeconomic variables with an IRB dummy to allow for a differential impact of the business cycle on IRB and Standardized banks. The results of these estimations (not reported in the interest of space) are available on request.
17 The within firm standard deviation is 0.0044 for DLLPs and 0.48 for returns.
cash flows from the DLLPs of IRB banks (Wahlen 1994 , Liu & Ryan 2006 . We further perform F-tests to assess the relative change in the market valuation of DLLPs between the pre-and post-Basel II adoption periods. Our results show that the DLLPs of IRB banks increase significantly after the adoption of Basel II in all columns of Table 8 .
Following Kilic et al. (2013) , we also include double and triple interactions of EBPT to ensure that the change in the valuation of DLLPs after Basel II is not driven by other confounding effects. In principle, the relation between EBPT and returns should not be influenced by the adoption of Basel II. However, an increase in both the market valuation of IRB banks' EBPT and DLLPs could suggest that, overall, an increase in the informativeness of IRB banks' reported numbers occurred independent of the implementation of Basel II.
Our results show a negative and significant Basel*EBPT interaction, suggesting that the market decreases the valuation of EBPT in the post-Basel II period. This result is consistent with the idea that earnings are less informative in periods of economic turmoil. Moreover, the Basel*IRB*EBPT coefficient is insignificant in all but one column. In fact, using an 
Selection
We further check the robustness of our results to a modification in the manner in which we handle the small group of banks that did not adopt IRB from the beginning, but changed status in the years following the adoption of Basel II. So far, we treated late adopters as Standardized banks up until the year of their switch to IRB. We run our tests again by considering the banks that switch from the Standardized to the IRB group after the Basel II adoption as Standardized during the full sample period, even after they switch to IRB.
This helps mitigate potential identification issues and ensures that our results are not driven by differences in the underlying characteristics and structure of banks in the two groups.
Grouping switchers with Standardized banks is likely to weaken our results by reducing our DiD coefficients. The coefficients can be viewed as lower bounds because we consider a case that is least favorable in terms of finding significant results. Our results are robust to the use of this different classification of banks into IRB and Sandardized banks, which indicates that the change in the market valuation of the DLLPs of IRB banks can be attributed to the adoption of Basel II. 18
Placebo
The validity of DiD estimations relies on the parallel trends assumption for the IRB and Standardized groups. Although it is difficult to directly test this assumption, we build on Schnabl (2012), Srivastava (2014) and Chodorow-Reich (2014) , and perform a series of placebo tests. The tests consist of re-estimating our models, but with an intervention that occurs in 2007-one year before the adoption of Basel II. 19 To confirm that our results are due to the impact of Basel II, we expect that in all placebo estimations our main coefficients of interest will be insignificant. The results for our three tests (available on request) mostly confirm our findings. With the 2007 placebo, we find no significant effect for either income-increasing or income-decreasing DLLPs. Regarding income-smoothing, we find no significant Placebo*IRB*EBPT interaction in any of the specifications. Significant pre-placebo intervention differences exist between the two groups only in the reduced sample, which is possibly due to there being only one year left in the pre-adoption period.
Moreover, in the entire sample, we find a significant change in income-smoothing in 2007 for
Standardized banks, which confirms that these banks increase the level of income-smoothing in response to the crisis one year before the implementation of Basel II. 20 Finally, in the market valuation tests, we find no significant effect of any of our DLLP interactions, which confirms our main results.
U.S. control sample
To further check the robustness of our results, we construct a second control sample com- Table 3 show descriptive statistics on the U.S. sample. Consistent with Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011) , banks in our U.S. control sample are smaller than the European ones. Table 9 shows the results of our three main estimations obtained with the U.S. control group. Overall, in all model specifications, the direction and significance of our main coefficients of interest are similar to the ones in our results for Standardized banks. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show the effect of Basel II on income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs. The magnitude of the effect of Basel on income-increasing DLLPs is very similar to the one obtained using Standardized banks: a decrease of -0.0016 vs. -0.0011 for the EU sample, significant at the 5% level in both cases. Similar to the EU sample, no significant effect of Basel II exists on income-decreasing DLLPs for IRB relative to U.S. banks.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 show the effect of Basel II on banks' income smoothing. A significantly lower pre-intervention level of income-smoothing exists for U.S. banks, which is likely the result of stricter implementation of the incurred loss model in the United States (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011) . The Basel*EBPT interaction is insignificant in both models, which means that the level of income smoothing of U.S. banks after the implementation of Basel II did not change. However, the Basel*IRB*EBPT interaction is negative and significant at the 5% level in both specifications, and the coefficients are larger than for the Standardized control group (-0.3 vs. -0.2). Finally, for the market valuation of DLLPs, although the Basel*IRB*DLLP triple interaction is not significant, in terms of sign and magnitude, the coefficients are quite similar to the ones we find using the Standardized sample (15 and 23 vs. 30 and 17). Overall, the use of the U.S. sample as a control group confirms our results with the Standardized banks as control group.
Conclusion
Although Basel II has sparked substantial debate and scholarly interest in recent years, its 
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IRB banks to decrease the use of income-increasing DLLPs, typically viewed as particularly opportunistic. Recognizing less income-increasing DLLPs shields IRB banks from suffering regulatory capital reductions. In turn, this phenomenon contributes to the financial stability of IRB banks, in line with banking regulators' objectives. Yet, the incentive for using incomeincreasing DLLPs still persists for Standardized banks-an aspect recently criticized in the literature (Rossignolo, Fethi & Shaban 2013) . Given the worldwide financial consequences of banking crises, it is important to provide harmonized regulations and avoid conflicting signals, which might otherwise lead to high economic and societal costs. Further, this change impacts Tier 1 capital by the after-tax and after-dividend amount, -∆LLP(1-tax rate)(1-d), where d is the dividend payout rate. In the pre-Basel II period, banks have little incentive to recognize positive (income-decreasing) LLPs because doing so has an adverse impact on earnings, of -∆LLP(1-tax rate), and on regulatory capital, of -∆LLP(1-tax rate)(1-d).
Basel II modifies the effect of LLPs on regulatory capital by introducing a direct link between LLPs and both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital of ∆LLP/2 each. This makes the net effect of LLPs on regulatory capital positive with magnitude +∆LLP(1-(1-tax rate)(1-d)) in the post-Basel II period, thus providing banks with an incentive to increase LLPs as a result of the new regulation.
The overall effect of the Basel II adoption on the effect of LLPs and regulatory capital is ∆LLP, which depends neither on the tax rate nor on the dividend payout ratio. (1): DLLP ict ≡ε ict , whereε ict is the estimated residual of Equation (1) EBPT ict Earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets in Equations (2) and (3), and scaled by the beginning market value of equity (market capitalization), obtained from Datastream, in Equation (4) Loan ict Beginning total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets ∆Loan ict Change in total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets NPL ict Beginning non-performing scaled by beginning total assets ∆NPL ict Change in non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets in Equations (2) and (3), and scaled by the beginning market value of equity (market capitalization), obtained from Datastream, in Equation (4) Size ict Natural logarithm of beginning total assets
Growth ict Growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of year t 2.318 LLP is defined as loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; EBPT is earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; Loan is loans scaled by beginning total assets; ∆Loan is change in loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL is non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets; ∆NPL is the change in non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets; Loss is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise; Size is the natural logarithm of beginning total assets; Growth is the growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of year t; Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets; NCO is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets; R is the annual return from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t + 1; DLLP are discretionary loan loss provisions, computed as the residuals of the regression of LLPs on their normal determinants, as per Equation (1). We further distinguish between positive (income-decreasing) and negative (income-decreasing) DLLPs, which we use as dependent variables in Equation (2); GDP Growth is the annual rate of change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product; ∆Unemployment is the annual change in country-specific unemployment; House Price Index is the country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB) for the EU, and the Case Shiller Index for the United States; Term Spread is the country-specific difference between short-term and long-term interest rates, obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB). LLP is defined as loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; EBPT is earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; Loan is loans scaled by beginning total assets; ∆Loan is change in loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL is non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets;
∆NPL is the change in non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets; Loss is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise; Size is the natural logarithm of beginning total assets; Growth is the growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of year t; Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets; Basel is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the period after the bank adopted Basel II and 0 otherwise; IRB is a dummy variable that equals 1 for IRB banks and 0 for Standardized ones; NCO is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets; R is the annual return from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t + 1. 
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, LLP ict stands for loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets, NPL ict and ∆NPL ict are non-performing loans and their first difference, respectively, scaled by beginning total assets, Loan ict and ∆Loan ict , are loans and their first difference, respectively, scaled by beginning total assets, NCO ict is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets, and ε ict is a residual. 
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, DLLP ict are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of Equation (1), Baselt is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB i is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, LLP ic,t−1 is lagged LLP scaled by beginning total assets, EBPT ict is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets, Loss ict is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, Size ict is bank size measured as the log of beginning total assets, Growth ict is the growth rate of total assets, Tier1 ict is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, GDP Growthct is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemployment ct is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, γ t is a time effect, δ i is a bank fixed effect, and ε ict is a residual. Basel t and IRB i are included in the equation for completeness of the DiD effect, but the θ 1 and θ 2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects and year dummies in the estimations that include them. 
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, LLP ict stands for loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets, Basel t is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB i is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, EBPT ict is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets, NPL ict and ∆NPL ict are non-performing loans and their first difference, respectively, scaled by beginning total assets, Loan ict and ∆Loan ict , are loans and their first difference, respectively, scaled by beginning total assets, NCO ict is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets, Tier1 ict Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, Size ict is bank size measured as the log of beginning total assets, GDP Growth ct is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemployment ct is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, HPIct is the country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return obtained from the European Central Bank, Term Spread ct is the country-specific difference between short-term and long-term interest rates, γ t is a time effect, δ i is a bank fixed effect, and ε ict is a residual. Basel t and IRB i are included in the equation for completeness of the DiD effect, but the θ 1 and θ 2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects and year dummies. 
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where, for bank i, year t, and country c, R ict is the annual stock return measured from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t + 1, Basel t is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB i is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, DLLP ict are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of of the LLP equation, EBPT ict is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), ∆NPL ict is non-performing loans scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), NCO ict is net charge-offs scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), γt is a time effect, δ i is a bank fixed effect, and ε ict is a residual. Baselt and IRB i are included in the equation for completeness of the DiD effect, but the θ 1 and θ 2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects, and year dummies in the estimations that include them. (2), (3), and (4) when we use U.S. commercial banks as a control group. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables are, respectively, income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs. Income smoothing results are shown in Columns (3) and (4), where LLPs are the dependent variable, and Columns (5) and (6) show market valuation results where the dependent variable is the annual stock return measured from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t + 1. Basel is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, EBPT is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets in Columns (3) and (4) and by the market value of total equity (market capitalization) in Columns (5) and (6), LLP (lagged) are lagged loan loss provisions, scaled by beginning total assets in Columns (3) and (4) and by the market value of total equity (market capitalization) in Columns (5) and (6), Loss is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, Loan and ∆Loan, are loans and their first difference, respectively, scaled by beginning total assets, NPL is non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets, ∆NPL is change in non-performing loans scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), Tier 1 is Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, Size is bank size measured as the log of beginning total assets, Growth is the growth rate of total assets, DLLP are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of Equation (1), NCO is net charge-offs scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), GDP Growth is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemployment is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, HPI is the country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return.
